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CORPORATIONS
LIABILITY OF A HOLDING COMPANY FOR ACTS OF ITS SUB-
SIDIARY.
A ninety-nine year lessee sub-leased the property to the Higbee
Realty Company, a subsidiary of the Higbee Company. The subsidiary
sub-leased the premises for ten years to the holding company. The first
lessee assigned the lease to a trustee, and trust certificates were issued.
After the ten year lease expired, the subsidiary defaulted in its payments
on the ninety-nine year lease. Plaintiffs are the certificate holders and
brought a class suit against the holding company for the recovery of
taxes and rents, the trustee having become insolvent. A verdict was
rendered in favor of the parent corporation. North et al. v. The Higbee
Co. et. al. 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N. E. (2d) 391, 6 Ohio Op. I66, Ohio
Bar, July 20, 1936.
The court held that, notwithstanding the fact that the subsidiary
was controlled through stock ownership and had the same officers and
directors, the separate corporate entities of parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions would not be disregarded unless the subsidiary was formed for the
purpose of perpetrating a fraud. The trial court found that there was
no fraud in the fact that the parent corporation was in the mercantile
business and organized the subsidiary to sever itself from its realty hold-
ings. Three of the Justices in the principal case dissented on the ground
that the subsidiary was a mere instrumentality and a fictional device to
avoid liability. Under the rule of the majority opinion, it would be
necessary for the subsidiary to be formed for the purpose of perpetrating
a fraud, and actually used by the parent corporation to defraud the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued in their briefs, that the former Ohio
cases do not preclude recovery if the subsidiary was originally organized
for a bona fide purpose and was subsequently used to perpetrate a fraud
or wrong. The cases cited in support of this proposition were: State v.
Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279, 15 L.R.A. 145
(1892); Cemetery Association v. Traction Co., 93 Ohio St. 161, 112
N.E. 596 (1915); A4uglaize Box Board Co. v. Hinton, IOO Ohio St.
505, 126 N.E. 881 (I919); The Damascus Mfg. Co. v. Union Trust
Co., 119 Ohio St. 439, 164 N.E. 530, 28 Ohio L. Rep. 6, 6 Ohio L.
Abs 710, (1928); Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Universal Coal Co., 28
Ohio N.P. (N. S.) 563 (1931).
As a general rule,-a holding company is not liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries. Stone v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 202 N.Y. 352,
216
95 N.E. 8i6, 35 L.R.A. (N. S.) 770 (1911); Majestic Co., v.
Orpheum Circuit, 21 Fed. (2d) 720 (1927); First National Bank v.
Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); Harlon Pub. Serv.
Co., v. Eastern Constr. Co., 254 Ky. 135, 71 S. W. (2d) 24 (1934).
In formulating a basis for predicating liability the courts have used
various theories. Courts have variously used the "agency" and "instru-
mentality" theories, the latter being referred to in many cases as the
"identity," "alter ego," "adjunct" or "conduit" theories. The latter
theory is to the effect that the "parent corporation will be responsible
for the obligations of its subsidiary when its control has been exercised to
such a degree that the subsidiary has become its mere instrumentality."
Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (93), p. 8. The
agency theory is predicated upon the application of the general principles
of agency, whereas the instrumentality doctrine is somewhat broader
in its scope and application. Judge Cardozo in the case of Berkey v.
Third ,venue Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58 (1926),
said, "Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by
the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the sub-
sidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the
tests of honesty and justice." Whereas the agency theory maintains the
corporate separateness, the identity theory has the opposite effect, inas-
much as the latter theory wholly disregards the corporate identity of the
subsidiary. Powell, supra, Chapter V. In the case of Smith v. Knight
& Son, 211 Ky. II1, 277 S.W. 290 (1925), the court said that it
must appear that the company is the business conduit or alter ego of the
other, before there can be liability on this theory. Thomas, TheoriesUsed
in Holding the Parent Liable for the Acts and Obligations of the Sub-
sidiary Corporation, 24 Cal. L. Rev. 447 (1936).
It then becomes a question of determining what circumstances will
render the subsidiary an "instrumentality". Control through stock
ownership alone, does not make the parent corporation liable for the acts
of its subsidiary. General Motors Corp. v. Moffett, 27 Ohio App. 219,
6 Ohio L. Rep. 367 (1927); Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, supra;
Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corp. et al, 29 Fed. (2d)
623 (1928); U. S. v. Reading, 253 U.S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425, 64 L.
Ed. 76o (1920); The Continental & C. T. & S. Bank v. Garden
City Co., 123 Kans. 659 (1927); McDermott v. Oil Burner Sales
Corp. 266 Ill. App. 115 (1932); Harlan Pub. Serv. Co. v. Eastern
Constr. Co., supra; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267
U.S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 25o, 69 L. Ed. 634 (1925); Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 41 Ind. 67, 1I8 At. 279(1922);
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Ballantine, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal. L.R. 12
(1925). The additional factor of common directors or officers has been
held not to be controlling, although in many cases it is an important
factor. Pagel, Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 258 N.Y.S. 168
(1932); Pittsburgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584 (1916);
Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, supra; Owl Fumigating Corp. v.
California Cyanide Co., 24 Fed. (2d) 718 (1928); Berkey v. Third
Avenue Railway Co., supra. The mere addition to the foregoing ele-
ments of one or more factors may be sufficient to render the subsidiary
a mere "instrumentality." Where the parent corporation furnished
capital to finance the subsidiary it was held not to be sufficient control,
Berkey v. Third 4venue Railway Co., supra. But in the following cases
the parent was held liable; parent corporation formed subsidiary and
subscribed to its stock, The Willem Van Driel Sr., 252 Fed. 35
(i918); subsidiary was a mere division or department of the parent
corporation and dealt only with the parent, Westinghouse Electric &
Mfg. Co. v. lllis-Chalmers Co., 176 Fed. 362 (191o); parent cor-
poration used property of subsidiary as its own, Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck
Co., 242 N.Y. 1O6, 151 N.E. 146 (1926); failure to keep separate
books, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 540,
62 L. Ed. 1142 (1918). The following fact situations are important
elements to be considered: the paying of salaries and losses of subsidiary
by the parent; the directing of officers of the subsidiary by those of the
parent; where the subsidiary has a grossly inadequate capital; where
formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed. Powell,
Supra, p. 9; Stevens on Corporations (1936), p. 8o; Douglas and
Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
Yale L.J. 193 (1929), at 195 ft. note, writers list some eighteen factors
that may be controlling; see also, Kingston Dry Dock Co..v. Lake
Champlain Transp. Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 265 (1929); Lowendahl v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 287 N.Y.S. 62 (1926); U. S. v. Reading,
supra; Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Col. L.R.
496 (1912). Yost, Liability of a Parent Corporation for the Debts of
its Subsidiary, 21 St. Louis L. Rev. 234, 240 (1936).
Assuming that there are sufficient facts to warrant the conclusion
that the subsidiary is an agent or the instrumentality of the parent, is
there a further necessity of finding fraud in the formation of the sub-
sidiary or in its use? Many courts have predicated liability on agency
or instrumentality concepts, while some courts have considered fraud
essential before there is a sufficient basis for liability. The corporate entity
will be disregarded when necessary to prevent or circumvent fraud, or
when one corporation is merely the instrumentality of the other. Gillis
v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 84 Fed (2d) 74 (1936); McDer-
mott v. Oil Burner Sales Corp., supra; Pacific A9merican Gasoline Co.
v. Miller, 76 S.W. (2d) 833 (Texas) at 851 (1934); State v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., supra; Parkside Cemetery Assn. v. Traction Co., supra, at
173, 174. Either control or fraud is sufficient basis to disregard the cor-
porate entity. In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (1909).
"There is a consistent determination by courts to look through corporate
forms, and this disposition is shown with increasing firmness as the in-
texests of justice require." Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Hinton, supra, at
518. The identity theory has been used where parent corporation uses
the subsidiary to avoid liability. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Faris, 6o
S.W. (2d) 425 (Tenn. 1933). Where the subsidiary is used to evade
a statute or defeat public convenience, the separateness of the entities
will be denied. Stevens on Corporations, supra, at page 8I. Examples
are: attempt to do an act which parent could not lawfully do, U. S. v.
Reading, supra; illegal combination in restraint of trade, Northern Se-
curities Co. v. U. S., 193 U.S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679
(1904); to defeat bona fide creditors, In re Marcella Cotton Mils, 8
Fed. (2d) 522 (1925); See also: Pacific American Gasoline Co. v.
Miller, supra, at 851; Detroit Motor A4ppliance Go. v. General Motors
Corp., 5 Fed. Supp. 27 (1933); Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations
(perm. Ed.) 1931, Vol. I, pp. 154-176. Two courts have applied a
rather strict rule. They held that there must be sufficient control and
the element of fraud to predicate liability. Continental Securities & In-
vestment Co. v. Rawson, 2o8 Cal. 288, 280 Pac. 954 (1929);
Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co., i5o Wash. 235, 272 Pac.
962 (1928).
In many cases, recovery against the parent corporation has been
denied because the complainant has not been injured as a result of the
parent corporation's undue control, or because the complainant has an
adequate remedy without resort to the parent corporation. The control
and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or loss complained
of by the plaintiffs. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra;
Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, supra. Courts have permitted re-
covery on the doctrine of estoppel, where there has been a misrepresen-
tation by the parent corporation in holding itself out as being behind the
subsidiary. Plattv. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
However, there can be no estoppel unless the complainant relied upon
and was misled by the representations of the parent corporation. Pagel,
Horton & Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., supra; Powell, supra, Chapter
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IV, par. I5; The Disregard of the Corporate Fiction, Maurice
Wormser (1929); 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1154. It becomes readily ap-
parent from the foregoing discussion that one cannot answer the question
as to when the corporate entity will be disregarded in a particular case.
Justice Cardozo in the Berkey case, supra, said, the whole subject is
"still enveloped in the mists of metaphor". Each case must be decided
on its own facts and must be regarded as "sui generis." Industrial Re-
search Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra; 4 Minn. L. Rev. 219,
227. See generally, Latty, Subsidiaries and Affiliated Corporations
(1936); reviewed by Wormser in 31 III. L. Rev. 700 (I937).
The rule in the principal case to the effect that the separate cor-
porate entities of the parent and subsidiary corporations will not be dis-
regarded, unless the subsidiary was formed for the purpose of prepetrat-
ing a fraud, is both fair and practical if the court means to limit the rule
to the instrumentality concept of liability. "There is in many cases much
loose talk about 'ignoring the corporate fiction' and 'looking at the
substance rather than the form.' But the corporate capacity is a legal
fact, not a fiction." Ballantine, supra, at page 2o. However, if the Su-
preme Court means to preclude liability on the basis of agency, it is un-
fortunate. The doctrine of agency is equally applicable in parent-sub-
sidiary relationships as it is in partnership or other personal relationships.
It has been said that "problems of responsibility for fraud or for the acts
of a corporation used as an agent are to be solved not by 'disregarding'
the corporate personality, but by the application of the usual principles of
liability for the acts of other persons or for collusion with them." Ballan-
tine, supra, at page 2o.
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DEEDS
BONA FIDE PURCHASER UNDER ESCRow DEED
The plaintiff made a warranty deed, naming her daughter as
grantee. She intended to give it to her (plaintiff's) son, who was to
hold it until her death, on which event it was to be given to grantee.
The grantee's husband wrongfully got possession of the deed and had
it recorded. The grantee then obtained a loan from the Ohio Valley
Bank, giving the latter her promissory notes. In making the loan the
bank relied on her record title to the land, but it did not take a mort-
gage. The defendant, in charge of liquidating the bank, procured
judgment on the notes and levied execution against the property. The
